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Theorizing what knowledge is given that it isn't simply justified true belief has 
been, of course, a major project of the last half-century, and even when authors 
haven't taken on any sort of conceptual analysis of knowledge, the need to 
motivate, and then accommodate, counterexamples to JTB remains nearly 
universal in epistemology.  David Lewis includes Gettier on a short list of two 
possible cases in which conclusive philosophical refutations may have occurred -- 
the other case being Gödel (1983, x). The existence of this volume is itself further 
evidence of the disciplinary centrality of Gettier's work in epistemology, if any 
such further evidence were somehow needed!  But there has long been a small 
but interesting set of epistemological dissenters as well (see, e.g., Kaplan (1985); 
Sartwell (1991); Hetherington (2012); and also Turri (2012) for a friendly if 
ultimately critical take on Gettier-dissent). I am here aligned with the forces of 
dissent, and will contend that we ought not take the rejection of JTB as a firm 
constraint on our theories of knowledge. 
     
I. Noise, models, and overfitting: A general argument for simpler theories in 
philosophy  
 
My argument for re-opening the books on JTB is fundamentally methodological, 
and starts with the method of cases -- short vignettes and our evaluations of their 
epistemic content, and a strong norm in practice that theories of knowledge must 
cleave fairly closely to those evaluations.   Although general theoretical concerns 
can and do inform our discussions the inadequacy of JTB as an account of 
knowledge, nonetheless, I suspect those principles themselves are often backed, 
perhaps implicitly, by the case evidence.    Some have contended that Gettier does 
not merely monger cases, but offers arguments for his suggested evaluations of 
them (e.g., Deutsch (2015); Cappelen (2012).  Whether this is true as a matter of 
proper historical understanding of the original paper -- though I have my doubts, 
and see, e.g., Weatherson's (2014) response to Cappelen -- it is clearly false about 
the way that Gettier's insights have percolated through epistemology.  Quite 
clearly the focus in almost all discussions are about "Gettier cases" or "Gettier's 
counterexample" and so on.  (For example, try googling on "Gettier case" or 
"Gettier cases", and then "Gettier's argument", and the difference in the number 
of instances is stark.)  And much of the literature has been focused on generating 
more such cases, testing novel accounts against them, and repeating that cycle, to 
the point that quite a taxonomy of different Gettier cases can now be reviewed. 
(see Blouw et al., this volume).  I take it that such case-based methods depend on 
the idea that we are on the whole better at tracking what is or is not a case of 
knowledge, than we are at directly recognizing correct or incorrect principles 
about knowledge as such.  We humans are at least middlingly decent 
epistemometers, when it comes to cases and especially cases within the ordinary 
reach of our experiences, and that's why it makes sense for us to appeal to our 
sense of the right verdict in such cases when we are building and critiquing our 
theories of knowledge. This is not at all to be committed to the extravagant view 
that we only can, should, or do appeal to such cases; obviously none of that is so. 
But to the fairly large extent that we do appeal to them in epistemology, we are 
making that presupposition of the broad reliability of our particularist capacity 
for epistemic evaluation.  So our methodological discussion can take as a starting 
point that our epistemometric capacities are not by and large a matter of explicit 
inference or argument, and the it will generally not make sense to ask in regard to 
these verdicts, what an individual's deliberately-deployed premises and mode of 
inference was in arriving at it. In that way, they play a methodological role very 
similar to basic perceptual reports, whether there or or are not any deeper 
similarities to be found there. 
 
A quick terminological point: I will speak throughout of "verdicts" and "verdict 
data" and the like, so as to set aside the rather thorny debates about what 
intuitions are or aren't or even if we should speak in terms of "intuitions" at all.  
Not that such debates aren't important, but I do think they are orthogonal to the 
kinds of issues I will be attending to here.  Also, I will be understanding 
justification here in the traditional sense of a status that can be had even by false 
beliefs, and thus JTB is something that is in conflict which the Gettier verdict 
data as standardly understood, in taking those cases to be ones in which 
justification is fully present but not knowledge.  My main interest is in trying to 
explore ways in which inferential concerns can trump the apparent deliverances 
of our data.  So, I will not be engaging here with versions of JTB that say the 
agents in Gettier cases do not know, but because they are not even justified in the 
first place, since such theories generate no such data-versus-inference conflict. 
 
Similarly, although one could, at least in principle, attempt a methodological 
restoration of the prospects for JTB by attacking the basic reliability of the verdict 
data itself, I will not be pursuing such an argument here.  I bring up this 
argumentative strategy only in order to set it aside.  I have no wish to challenge 
that presupposition of decent-enough baseline reliability about cases, which has 
been defended amply in recent years (e.g., Williamson (2008), Boyd and Nagel 
(2014)).  One immediate concern about such an approach in this context, for 
example, is that it will be too costly: if we are to throw out the verdict data 
wholesale, then how do make a positive case for JTB, or any other theory of 
knowledge?  Some my be surprised to see me granting such a claim of substantial 
baseline reliability to our verdict data, since the contrary has sometimes been 
attributed to me (e.g., by Nagel in her (2012)). But in fact I have long been happy 
to endorse it (e.g., Weinberg (2007); Swain et al. (2008); Alexander and 
Weinberg (2014)). 
 
Granting this baseline reliability does not, however, not go very far towards 
settling the pressing methodological questions about how best to go about 
deploying such verdicts in our philosophizing.  There has been some attention to 
what further demands we might place on our practices with sources of evidence, 
beyond their being merely baseline reliable, and whether our practices in 
philosophy perhaps fall short of those demands (Weinberg (2007); Alexander & 
Weinberg (2014)).  These discussions have all been focused on the conditions 
under which we make use of the verdict evidence.  But comparatively very little 
attention has been paid, however, to the structure, nature, and demands of our 
modes of inference that take that verdict evidence as a source of premises.  And 
that is where I will draw the materials from for my argument.  Part of my goal 
here is to shine some light on the methodology of philosophical inferences, 
beyond the standing debates about philosophical sources of evidence. 
 
For the susceptibility of our verdicts to error has methodological consequences 
beyond problematizing our initial deployments of them. This noisiness of this 
body of evidence also has implications for what inferences we might look to draw 
from them, and in particular, for when  considerations of simplicity should 
require us to disregard some of the apparent deliverances of the verdict data.1 
There are already a handful of very interesting extant attempts to bring such 
simplicity into philosophical methodology, and I will now discuss them briefly, 
with a bit of an aim towards criticism, but more to set up a contrast with my own 
preferred approach.  (They are all more or less consistent with each other, I think, 
but each brings very different sorts of background assumptions with it.)  There 
are at least 4 different ways that some sort of appeal to simplicity can be 
introduced, in order to motivate overriding Gettier intuitions in favor of JTB: a 
metaphysical appeal to features of natural properties; a metaphilosophical 
appeal to the desiderata on conceptual explications a la Carnap; an 
epistemological appeal to holistic virtues of good theories; and, finally, what I 
will be deploying here, a methodological appeal to the principles of model 
selection.   
 
Brian Weatherson in his (2003) works within a Lewisian/Siderian framework of 
reference magnetism, where the reference of a term is fixed largely but not 
exactly by use.  The set of cases that a speaker or community of speakers applies 
the term sets a major constraint upon, but does not by itself precisely fix, the 
reference of the term. Rather, the referent is whatever property best maximizes 
both closeness of fit to those cases, and its naturalness as a property.  Weatherson 
floats the idea that maybe JTB -- as the conjunction of what, he claims with at 
least prima facie plausibility, are three highly natural properties -- is so natural a 
property, that even if our intuitions have a Gettier-shaped bend in them, 
nonetheless "knows" in our mouths may really pick out JTB and not any sort of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  I	  am	  focusing	  on	  simplicity	  here,	  but	  another	  way	  in	  which	  noisiness	  can	  make	  trouble	  for	  philosophical	  inferences	  is	  that	  our	  modes	  of	  inference	  are	  often	  high	  in	  
epistemic	  demandingness	  (Nado	  2015)	  -­‐-­‐	  the	  theoretical	  claims	  in	  play	  tolerate	  very	  little	  variance	  from	  their	  highly	  specific	  predictions.	  I	  also	  pursue	  this	  concern	  in	  my	  (forthcoming),	  but	  not	  with	  as	  specific	  an	  eye	  towards	  Gettier	  and	  JTB.	  	  	  	  
JTB-plus-further-machinery-to-rule-out-Gettier-cases.  (I will henceforth use 
"JTBG" as a shorthand for theories with such a structure.)  More generally, the 
simplicity of an analysis should be expected, at least roughly, to track naturalness 
of property, and thus we have one pro tanto reason to prefer simpler theories. 
 
Stephen Crowley and I raise a number of worries for Weatherson's account in our 
(2009), such as the possibility that even more natural than JTB is, simply, 
knowledge.  In general, natural language terms of significant philosophical 
interest, like "knows" or, say, "cause", may be so eligible as referents, that we will 
be unable to use considerations of naturalness to motivate any sort of 
decompositional analysis whatsoever.  (A kind of Zagzebski/Williamson-meets-
Fodor kind of result.)  But I want to focus instead on a different worry that 
Crowley and I put forward: it may be too  methodologically intractable a criterion 
of simplicity to be of any real use in our philosophical practices.  Given a few 
different rival hypotheses as the referent of "knowledge", it might just not be 
humanly possibly to discern which is more natural than which.  Consider, e.g., 
JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF and TRUE BELIEF PRODUCED BY A RELIABLE 
BELIEF-PRODUCING MECHANISM.  It is, to put it mildly, not obvious which of 
those is more natural (and maybe they are equally so).  It is not only not obvious 
now, it is moreover hard to see what further investigations we could do in order 
to better ascertain their comparative naturalness.  And the problem only gets 
much, much worse if we suppose that we are faced not only with a larger set of 
hypotheses, but also a choice where various naturalness/closeness-of-fit trade-
offs are under consideration. 
 
A similar worry, I fear, would apply to any attempt to appeal to holistic virtues of 
JTB understood as a Carnapian explication of the concept "knows", as has been 
pressed recently by Olson (2015). On Olson's proposal, the pragmatic nature of 
explicatory projects provide the motivation for the holistic considerations, such 
as simplicity, fruitfulness, and exactness, that may ultimately give us reasons to 
override rather than solve the Gettier problem.  One drawback of appealing to 
this Carnapian metaphilosophy, however, is that it is not clear how many 
epistemologists are signed on to it, and may not appreciate the idea that these 
more pragmatic considerations should be brought in to determining our best 
theory of knowledge.  But there are other possible motivations for appealing to 
holistic criteria as a matter of theory selection, even among philosophers who do 
not adopt that metaphilosophical framework.  One can find several leading 
philosophers appealing to holistic considerations about simplicity and the like, 
not in terms of the pragmatic demands of explication but rather as what they take 
to be a matter of sound epistemology, in following the lead of good scientific 
inference (e.g., Paul (2012); Nolan (2015)). Such philosophers would advocate 
considering simplicity/closeness-of-fit trade-offs on more general 
epistemological grounds, rather than metaphilosophical ones -- considerations 
about getting closer to the truth, rather than what we might want from our 
theories beyond just being true. 
 
These philosophers all present considerations that might serve to motivate re-
opening the question of whether JTB is to be preferred as a theory of knowledge, 
even while accepting that the Gettier cases provide data against it. But I am not 
sure that the very general invocation of such holistic appeals can take us very far 
towards answering that question.  I fear we will end up falling back not so much 
on unmootable intuitions about case verdicts, but more on ones about which of a 
set of theories is more elegant, and so on.  Similar to the difficulties with applying 
Weatherson's framework, even comparing rival theories with regard to those 
criteria themselves may be hard enough, and the difficulty increases drastically 
once we look to evaluate proposed trade-offs between theories of varying 
elegance and similarly varying closeness to usage.   
 
(Even if we cannot answer such questions well with Olson's Carnapian 
framework, it seems to me that that framework suggests instead that we should 
maybe consider changing the question.  There is no need for a unique correct 
answer, but rather we could have a set of different knowledge-flavor 
reconstructions available on hand, where some might be better suited to some 
intellectual tasks, and others to others.  I will take this point up again towards the 
end.) 
 
The view I am promoting here is consistent with the above approaches, while 
having a distinct methodological motivation that, I hope, offers a bit more 
machinery to help determine how such trade-offs might best be made. In some 
sense, my view applies considerations of simplicity at an earlier stage of inquiry.  
I am drawing not on the general criteria of what makes a good theory, over and 
above whatever the data may tell us, but rather on a concern about figuring out 
just what the data are really telling us in the first place.  Once one recognizes that 
one's data stream is itself fairly noisy, it becomes pressing to worry about the 
problem of overfitting in one's inferences and theory-selection.  Some of the 
patterning in one's data are tracking the underlying phenomenon one wishes to 
capture in one's model -- but some of it is instead just tracking the noise.  A 
tension arises between striving to capture all of the information about the real 
target structure on the one hand, while avoiding having one's model become itself 
captured by spurious twists and turns in the data. 
 
I appealed in a recent paper (2015a) to the economist Robin Hanson's discussion 
of the methodological implications of having a noisy source of data.  He was 
specifically discussing these implications in the context of ethics, and in terms of 
intuitions, but the point is easily seen mutatis mutatis to apply to other sorts of 
verdict data in application to other domains: 
 
The larger one expects errors to be, the more one tends to prefer the 
simpler of two curves. This is because larger errors will tend to produce 
larger local fluctuations in data points, and these make it harder to discern 
local changes in the underlying curve. 
In ethical “curve-fitting,” one’s “data” is a set of moral intuitions 
about what the right actions are in various particular circumstances. 
Regarding ethical choices made by a group, this data might consist of 
intuitions from all group members, while for choices made by an 
individual, the data might be limited to that person’s intuitions. One’s 
“curves” are sets of ethical “principles,” generally conceived. These can be 
very general principles, so-called “mid-level” principles, or perhaps the set 
of ethical choices made in certain prototypical cases (together with the 
relative salience of considerations used to interpolate between these 
cases). Together, a set of ethical principles should suggest right actions, 
and how they vary across some relevant range of circumstances. (Hanson 
(2002), 156) 
 
More generally, to the greater extent that one expects noise in one's verdict data 
about some philosophical domain, to a similar extent one should prefer a simpler 
"curve" in terms of the structure of the philosophical generalizations that data is 
taken to support.  As with the philosophers canvassed above, we are set up to 
consider a fit/simplicity trade-off, but in addition to drawing on a different set of 
motivations for how to think about that trade-off, we now can see a further key 
difference in how these considerations may be applied in practice. For the 
methodological considerations about curves and over-fitting offers some 
guidance about at least one factor that can influence how that tension between 
simplicity and fit should be managed.  It tells us that the more we know about the 
nature of our source of evidence, the more clarity we can expect to achieve in 
gauging how best to make the trade-off.  In motto form: more noise means 
simpler curves. 
 
When I discussed these general methodological ideas in that (2015a), I raised the 
question, more or less in passing, of whether maybe we should take seriously the 
possibility that knowledge is justified true belief after all.  I now want to push that 
point more forcefully, and not hypothetically: K=JTB really does need to be 
reckoned with as a still-live hypothesis. However, I don't think we are yet at a 
point methodologically to settle the question one way or the other.  So I am not 
going to be arguing for the truth of K=JTB itself, so much as arguing for its live 
epistemic possibility at our current state of epistemological inquiry. 
 
Of course, the general methodological point of that motto does not by itself put 
any pressure on epistemology or on K=JTBG at all: we must also have some 
information as to how noisy our verdict data is.  This is where experimental 
philosophy becomes highly salient, for the last decade and a half of "negative 
program" x-phi indicates a substantial amount of noise in our intuitive data 
across many areas in philosophy.  I won't bother rehearsing it all here: order 
effects, ethnicity effects, personality trait effects, framing effects, font effects, and 
so on and on.  The list of odd influences on philosophical verdicts continues to 
grow. (See, e.g., Buckwalter (2012) and Alexander & Weinberg (2014) for a recent 
discussions.)   These results have most typically been mustered in service of 
various sorts of debunking arguments, either targeting some specific case, or our 
verdict-data practices on the whole.  What I think has not been pointed out yet, 
though, are the methodological consequences for philosophical inferences based 
on such evidence.  Even if one does not think these findings are a reason for a 
radical revision of when and where we can legitimately appeal to verdict 
evidence, these negative program x-phi results provide a general reason to raise 
the bar significantly for when we should introduce new complications into our 
theory of in some philosophical domain, even when doing so would be required 
to capture some set of verdicts.   
 
II. Is there Gettier-specific noise? 
 
I have so far framed the methodological point very generally, not in any way 
Gettier-specifically, and indeed these concerns should have wide application. For 
example, such concerns should also give pause to proponents of other theories 
that would introduce complications into the shape of the classical theory of 
knowledge, such as contextualism or contrastivism.  But the consequences of 
noise for the fit/simplicity trade-off can also be made in more local and targeted 
ways: to the extent that some particular region of one's data is especially noisy, to 
that extent one should be even more reticent to let patterns apparent in that 
region drive complications into one's theory.  And  the current state of play with 
regard to verdicts about Gettier cases is pretty noisy -- noisier, at least, than that 
background degree of clang and clatter afflicts our epistemic verdicts on the 
whole.    
 
Now, it hasn't been quite the noise we were looking for, when Steve Stich, Shaun 
Nichols, and I found some preliminary evidence about 15 years ago that led us to 
suggest that intuitions about non-knowledge JTB might be culturally 
variable. Such cultural variability would have indeed presented a worrisome piece 
of noise in our epistemic usage, if it had only been, well, true.  But recent 
attempts at replication have, very much to the contrary, revealed a fairly stable 
trend away from the attribution of knowledge in such cases. (See Kim & Yuan 
(2014) for some recent such work, as well as an overview of similar recent results; 
I will also discuss some of the most recent cross-cultural work on Gettier cases a 
bit below.)  While disappointing -- no one likes having their results fail 
replication -- I think everyone should be glad to see experimental philosophy 
pursuing strong norms of replication here in our early days.   
 
Yet, while substantial cross-ethnic variation would have been one serious sort of 
noise, had it afflicted Gettier cases, it is of course far from the only kind of noise 
that one might need to watch out for.  And a growing set of other studies 
investigating Gettier cases of various sorts has shown them to be rather less clear 
as cases of non-knowledge than philosophical practice has taken them to be.   
  
For starters, at least some specific kinds of cases that have been claimed to 
register as JTB-without-K have been broadly debunked, including "fake barn" 
type cases in particular.  E.g., Colaço et al. (2014) and Turri et al. (2015); on the 
whole there is very little empirical evidence that fake barn-type cases are 
generally taken as exemplars of non-knowledge.  These findings should of course 
not in and of themselves negatively impact our evaluation of the state of evidence 
regarding other particular styles of Gettier cases, which overall yield different 
patterns of response (see Blouw et al. this volume).  But they do of course both 
weaken the overall case against JTB, and raise further worries about armchair 
methods which had fairly widely taken them to be cases of non-knowledge. (Not 
without some exception being taken from the armchair itself, interestingly: see 
Gendler and Hawthorne (2005).)  
 
Let us restrict our attention now to two of the most classic sorts of Gettier 
structures: unexpectedly defunct evidential sources, such as Russell's stopped 
clock; and the structure that Gettier himself innovated, in which there is in some 
sense divergence between a belief's truthmaker and the belief's justification.  (To 
be clear, I'm just trying to pick out the families of structures of cases here, not 
provide a precise analysis of them.)  The literature on the whole does clearly 
suggests the basic existence of what we might call a "Gettier effect", in which such 
structures produce lower levels of knowledge attribution than similar cases 
without such structures.  And in some studies, this effect has been very distinct, 
with subjects' responses going all the way to "floor" -- very low, and 
indistinguishable from the responses made to other paradigms of non-
knowledge, such as false beliefs and wild but lucky guesses. (E.g., Kim and Yuan 
(2014)).  At the same time, other studies indicate that the impact of Gettier 
structures on folk epistemic attribution may be somewhat more complicated, and 
I will discuss some of those results now.  First, though, let me emphasize that my 
argument does not actually require that there be Gettier-specific noise on 
evidence in the empirical literature, for the general noisiness of epistemic 
evaluations may be enough by itself to raise these worries about overfitting and 
simplicity.  However, there do seem to be two ways in which some Gettierological 
x-phi work strengthens those worries.  First, some studies have found Gettier 
cases with weak or even nonexistent Gettier effects.  Call this the intermittent 
effect problem.  Second, some studies have found evaluations to Gettier cases to 
be sensitive to factors that don't look like good candidates for inclusion in our 
theory of knowledge.  Call this the inappropriate sensitivity problem.    
 
In their important initial (2013a) attempt to demonstrate cultural uniformity of 
the Gettier effect, Jennifer Nagel and colleagues did indeed not find any 
differences across cultural groups in terms of the presence of that effect: there 
was a general trend across all groups in their sample to display the Gettier effect.  
But they also found that across all the groups they looked at, their Gettier cases 
produced a measurably less-than-maximal effect.  Indeed they end up needing to 
hypothesize some substantial error theories to accommodate a challenging twist 
in their results: their observed Gettier effect was as strong as what they take to be 
an inaccurate epistemic effect of the mere mention of a skeptical 
counterpossibility, which similarly -- too similarly -- depressed the rate of 
knowledge attributions of their participants.  Thus, while their results clearly 
indicate the existence of a Gettier effect, they also indicate that that effect is not 
similar in strength to those of more clear cases of non-knowledge, such as cases 
of false belief. 
 
One prominent study that presents an intermittent effect problem is Starmans 
and Friedman (2012), in which they found a robust Gettier effect for one class of 
case, that they call apparent evidence cases, but not in another, which they all 
authentic evidence cases.  As they explain their distinction, in apparent evidence 
cases, the agents at not point have proper evidence for their belief, e.g., it has 
always been based on an unreliable source.  But in authentic evidence cases, the 
agents at one time have good evidence for their belief, but then their 
circumstances change without their being aware of it, with a switch of truth-
makers.  This distinction has proved robust to several replications, though it is 
not at all clear that their preferred way of theorizing the distinction is the most 
epistemologically apt (see Nagel et al. 2013b, Starmans and Friedman 2013, and 
Blouw et al. this volume). 
 
In a study with an innovative "semantic integration" design, Powell et al. (2013) 
had subjects read vignettes that crucially involve being told that an agent thinks 
something at one point, but without use of the word "know" or similar terms, e.g., 
"Whatever the ultimate verdict would be, Dempsey thought Will was guilty." (In 
the vignette, Dempsey is a detective, and Will his prime suspect.)  After a short 
delay and a distractor task, the subjects then perform a fill-in-the-blanks memory 
task, with the mental state verb missing from the crucial passage, which they are 
then supposed to supply from their memory of the text they had just recently 
read.  In one of their cases (though I must add, not in all of them), Powell et al. 
report that in a case of Gettiered justified true belief, nearly half of their subjects 
falsely recalled seeing "know" at that point in the passage, indicating that they 
were at least unconsciously categorizing these cases as cases of knowledge. That 
is, they falsely recalled the sentence as "Whatever the ultimate verdict would be, 
Dempsey knew Will was guilty."  The underlying idea is that such recall errors are 
produced by subjects' accessing their stored representation of the content of the 
passage, and using that stored representation of the content to answer the 
question, rather than a literal recollection of the text.  Moreover, the subjects are 
also asked to make their own epistemic evaluation, e.g., whether Dempsey knew 
Will was guilty, or only thought Will was guilty.  Subjects in a Gettier condition 
made knowledge attributions at the same rate as those in a parallel non-Gettiered 
JTB case, and both were markedly elevated by comparison with a case in which 
the agent's belief was stipulated to be false. 
 
Reporting some preliminary findings from a large-scale project seeking out both 
uniformity and diversity across a broad range of cultures, Machery et al. 
(forthcoming-a) find a general Gettier effect across US, Brazilian, Indian and 
Japanese subjects, using a pair of structurally similar swapped-truthmaker 
Gettier cases but with different substantive topics (a patient in a hospital in one, 
and a co-worker on vacation in the other).  However, while the trend is 
consistently one in which the Gettier cases are not knowledge, in a number of the 
cases they examine, they also find that the Gettier effect is observably weaker 
than the effect of false belief.  Moreover, because their observed Gettier effects 
were often still some distance from the floor of false belief cases, the Machery et 
al. findings thus also left room for some degree of cross-nationality variation in 
the extent of the Gettier effects.  Even though all 4 nationalities displayed the 
overall trend of Gettier cases generally counting as not-knowledge, there seemed 
to be differences as to just how strong the effect was for the two types of cases 
they used.  The US subjects did not treat the two Gettier cases differently, but the 
other three nationalities did, generally attributing more knowledge in the 
hospital case than in the diamond case.  In both cases and across all 4 
populations, it never rises even close to half of the subjects attributing 
knowledge; my point is not that this is evidence of any group-level variation in 
the existence of the Gettier effect itself, but rather in the strength and uniformity 
of that effect.  Their results thus present a combination of both the intermittent 
effect problem, because the subjects's responses do not go to floor, and the 
inappropriate sensitivity problem, because the pattern of responses are at least 
somewhat variant with nationality. 
 
A further report from that global investigation (Machery et al. (forthcoming-b)) 
indicates that in addition to those potential cross-cultural instabilities, Gettier 
cases display both order and framing effects. The authors report that they “can 
make the Gettier intuition compelling or underwhelming by presenting it in 
different contexts. In particular, people find the Gettier intuition less compelling 
when a case describing a justified, but false belief is presented before a Gettier 
case. Furthermore, we report a surprising framing effect: Two Gettier cases that 
differ only in their philosophically irrelevant narrative details elicit substantially 
different judgments.” The difference in narrative details in their study concern 
the source of the agent’s accidentally true beliefs. In one case, the belief has 
acquired via testimony, and in the other, it has been acquired via perception (it is 
a classic stopped-clock case).  Their data show a Gettier effect that is markedly 
weaker in the perception case than in the testimony one. While the type of source 
for a belief is of course not epistemically irrelevant in general, nonetheless it is 
not a factor that has been anticipated to make a relevant difference with regard to 
the Gettier effect in particular. As such, their finding is yet another piece of prima 
facie evidence of inappropriate sensitivity. 
 
One dramatic threat of the inappropriate sensitivity problem can be found in 
work that hybridizes the Gettier effect with Joshua Knobe’s side-effect effect, to 
produce an “epistemic side-effect effect” in which the moral valence of an action's 
consequence apparently impacts the extent to which subjects will report that an 
agent knew that those consequences would or wouldn't happen.  In particular, if 
the actions brought about a negative moral consequence, subjects were more 
willing to say that the agent in the vignette knew that the consequence would 
happen, than if the actions brought about a positive moral consequence.  But it's 
not just that the Knobe effect can manifest epistemically -- it apparently can 
produce a central trend in favor of the attribution of knowledge even in cases 
with classic Gettier structures (Buckwalter 2013; Beebe & Shea 2013; with some 
preliminary cross-cultural replication by Kim and Yuan (in prep)).  One could 
defend the moral valence of consequences as being of epistemic relevance, as a 
kind of extreme form of pragmatic encroachment, but I suspect that most 
epistemologists would not wish to go that way. 
 
One last report of an inappropriate sensitivity result.  Turri et al. (2015) looked at 
a number of variations of Gettier-type structures, and they report a substantial 
effect of how closely the swapped truthmaker resembles the original truthmaker, 
in which less resemblance predicts a lower degree of knowledge attribution.  
Merely swapping the agent's pen with a nearly-identical one appears to be 
consistent with comparatively high rates of knowledge attribution; replacing 
Jones' owning a Ford with the rather distinct sort of fact of Brown's being in 
Barcelona, seems to produce very low rates. Future research may be needed to 
determine whether similarity/dissimilarity per se is the best way to theorize this 
difference, but in all it does seem that cases with otherwise similar Gettier 
structures can produce rather disparate rates of knowledge attribution, and if the 
culprit here does turn out to be a matter of the resemblance between initial and 
final truthmakers, that does not seem like something we would want to be 
reflected in our theory of knowledge itself. 
 
In a nutshell: we find evidence that the "Gettier effect" is somewhat transient, 
appearing in some studies, and in some conditions in some studies, but not 
others; in many of the studies where it does appear, it is a diminished effect, not 
driving subjects to floor, or having an effect size of comparable scale to effects 
that are taken to be noise effects; and it shows evidence of sensitivity to irrelevant 
factors, such as the degree of resemblance between an original object and a 
swapped truthmaker, the moral valence of side-effects in the scenario, or 
nationality.  All in all, the Gettier effect provides a weaker signal about knowledge 
than we epistemologists seem on the whole to have taken it to provide, and it 
seems to have its own special susceptibility to noise.  Thus we have a sharpening 
of the main argument for taking JTB to be still a live hypothesis: in general, more 
noise means simpler curves, and not only is there a fair amount of noise in the 
verdict evidence in general, but even more so, there's evidence of even more noise 
in the particular vicinity of the Gettier cases. 
 
I want to take a moment to be very clear about what is being contested here, and 
what is not.  I am not trying to argue that we should all in all take the right 
descriptive account of the folk epistemology of the Gettier cases to be up for 
grabs, let alone, as being pro-JTB.  Indeed, it is extraordinarily rare to find a 
version of switched-truthmaker or stopped-clock types of cases, in which even a 
small majority of subjects attribute knowledge. Even the original Weinberg et al. 
(2001) study reported their Asian sample only as having close to fifty-fifty 
verdicts here. At worst one sees a slight majority, in a handful of such 
versions; the epistemic side-effect effect cases are perhaps the most interesting 
outlier here. So it is definitely not going to be the case that one should take the 
verdict data here as actually pointing towards JTB.  I am not here challenging the 
overall picture that verdicts about Gettier cases trend towards the "not 
knowledge" direction.  In short, the experimental philosophy evidence really does 
point fairly clearly towards the existence of a Gettier effect on knowledge 
attributions. Rather, the point I am trying to press is that we have a fair amount 
of evidence at this time that, when one bounces these sorts of cases off human 
epistemometers, they often ricochet with more than a little spin on them, and can 
sometimes carom off in odd directions.  They bounce with varying degrees of 
force, and there seem to be a substantial range of ways in which odd, 
epistemically-inappropriate factors can push them around.  And as a further 
point of clarification, I am also not arguing that this amount of noise in itself rises 
to the level that we can now declare Gettier case verdicts on the whole unreliable, 
and that for such a reason they therefore should be pruned away from our total 
set of case verdict evidence.  Rather, I am looking to show how even while 
including these points in our total set of case verdict evidence, we have reason to 
worry about letting them shape our theory of knowledge to include machinery 
that will capture them.  Perhaps the Gettier verdicts, while overall of the sort that 
Gettier reported them to be, are nonetheless a kind of epistemic outlier that we 
should not allow much say in determining which theory of knowledge is correct. 
 
And the possibility that Gettier cases may be a kind of outlier shouldn't really be 
totally surprising to us, for reasons that bring me to my next supporting 
argument: Gettier cases are both rare and weird.  They are real, and probably 
every epistemologist has noticed at least couple-three cases in their own lives that 
fit that structure. (I know I have, anyhow.) But such cases represent a pretty thin 
slice of our epistemic lives, at best.  I will appeal here to the reader's own sense of 
how fairly uncommon they are -- I suspect that you've noticed them on a few 
occasions, but only a very few, and that they perhaps seemed particularly 
noteworthy to you on those occasions precisely because of their overall rarity. 
Note that the relevant sort of rarity does not concern the frequency of the 
occurrence of Gettier-type situations, but the frequency of epistemic evaluations 
of Gettier-type situations, in which the relevant aspects of the situation are 
recognized and even capable of being brought into the evaluation.  
 
This last point is closely related to the weirdness of such cases. What I have in 
mind here is that these cases are very different from the most ordinary sorts of 
cases that we evaluate as knowledge or not, in terms of the particular sorts of 
information that we have to bring together in recognizing their structure.  In the 
ordinary course of our epistemic evaluations of each other, we typically have 
information about an agent's take on some proposition in question, including 
whether or not they can be expected even to have a take in the first place; and we 
have information about how trustworthy we find their judgment, which also can 
(but much more often, doesn't) include specific information about what evidence 
they might cite on behalf of their view. And that's about it, isn't it?  We do not, in 
contrast, tend to have a lot of information, or even any information at all, about 
any specific inferential pathway our evaluative targets may have taken to arrive at 
their beliefs. And it seems to me we only in the rarest of circumstances are in a 
situation to know that their belief might be true, while also being aware of a range 
of possible truth-makers for that belief, I suspect that these elements, although 
central to the structure of many Gettier cases, represent dimensions of everyday 
epistemic evaluation that we simply do not hardly ever find ourselves concerned 
with.  It would be one thing if Gettier cases involved a highly unusual 
configuration of elements which individually were very commonly involved in our 
ordinary epistemic evaluations.  But the key structural elements themselves do 
not seem to me to play much of a role in our folk epistemologies.2  
 
And here I would appeal again to our own sense of the phenomenon, this time 
qua teachers of epistemology --  do you not very often find it rather challenging to 
get your undergraduates even to notice these structures when their grades 
depend on it?  And the Powell et al. results seem to indicate that often, unless 
folks are really hit squarely over the head with the Gettier structure, they just 
aren't particularly taken with them as failures of knowledge. The results of Turri 
(2013) are also salient here, as an example of a hit-and-miss Gettier effect: when 
simply presented with a Gettier case without any special window-dressing, his 
participants did not generally attribute knowledge, but were on the whole close to 
neutral as to the epistemic status of the case.  He also, very interestingly, found 
that you could get participants to rate the case overall as an instance of non-
knowledge if you went out of your way to emphasize its structure to them.  So 
while the folk are not totally blind to possible epistemic consequences of Gettier 
structures, they do not seem at all attentive to them, especially in contrast to 
factors like the truth or falsity of the target's beliefs, or whether the agent has any 
plausible evidence for the proposition at all or is just guessing.3 The Starmans & 
Friedman results, as well as what I suspect is a fairly common experience with 
undergraduates, suggests that this holds much more so for swapped-truthmaker 
sorts of cases than for unexpectedly-defunct-sources-of-evidence cases.4  
 
So we have little reason to think that our ordinary capacity to render knowledge 
verdicts is especially well-tuned to the presence of Gettier structure of situations. 
And we thus both should be unsurprised that there is a lot of noise in the vicinity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  I	  feel	  obligated	  to	  note	  that	  the	  claims	  in	  these	  last	  two	  paragraphs	  are	  heavily	  empirically	  committed,	  and	  subject	  to	  potential	  refutation	  by	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  studies.	  I	  would	  very	  much	  welcome	  such	  work	  -­‐-­‐	  whether	  it	  confirmed	  my	  estimations	  here	  or	  not	  -­‐-­‐	  and	  I	  am	  working	  now	  on	  a	  study	  to	  try	  to	  get	  a	  bit	  of	  a	  handle	  on	  the	  rarity	  question.	  3	  Turri	  does	  put	  forward	  an	  interesting	  interpretation	  of	  his	  findings	  to	  suggest	  that	  some	  instances	  where	  we	  detect	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  Gettier	  effect	  should	  be	  weighted	  more	  heavily	  than	  some	  instances	  where	  we	  do	  not.	  4	  Jennifer	  Nagel	  made	  the	  argument	  to	  me	  recently	  at	  a	  conference	  that,	  given	  the	  rarity	  and	  weirdness	  of	  these	  cases,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  folk	  epistemic	  evaluations	  are	  sensitive	  to	  Gettier	  structures	  at	  all	  suggests	  a	  kind	  of	  "poverty	  of	  stimulus"	  argument.	  	  If	  we	  didn't	  have	  some	  sort	  of	  innate	  epistemic	  predilection	  to	  be	  sensitive	  to	  such	  structures,	  how	  could	  we	  display	  even	  the	  intermittent	  and	  inappropriately	  sensitive	  Gettier	  effect	  that	  we	  do?	  It	  is	  an	  interesting	  argument,	  but	  ultimately	  I	  think	  it	  only	  shows	  that	  we	  must	  have	  some	  cognitive	  sensitivity	  to	  such	  structures	  in	  general,	  without	  that	  sensitivity	  being	  part	  of	  our	  distinctly	  epistemic	  cognition.	  	  The	  side-­‐effect	  effect	  is	  perhaps	  a	  useful	  comparison:	  it	  shows	  up	  across	  lots	  of	  our	  cognitive	  lives,	  including	  our	  attributions	  of	  causation,	  but	  should	  for	  that	  reason	  perhaps	  be	  treated	  as	  widely-­‐occurring	  potential	  source	  of	  noise	  across	  many	  (but	  not	  necessarily	  all)	  of	  the	  various	  domains	  in	  which	  it	  obtains.	  	  
of verdicts about Gettier cases, and, accordingly, should refuse to place any 
special weight on Gettier case verdicts in our inferences. 
 
III. Conclusion and Methodological Upshots 
 
To sum up: 
1. In any sort of model-building project where we can expect noise to be 
present in our data, we have to wrestle with the problem of overfitting, and the 
more noise we expect, the less we should let each dip and turn in the data 
determine our choice of best model.  In slogan form, more noise means simpler 
curves. 
 
2. We do not yet have good tools in philosophy for figuring out how exactly to 
make such trade-offs.  But the general level of noise we know to present in the 
verdict data is enough to make even seemingly radical such trade-offs live 
options. 
 
3. In the specific vicinity of Gettier cases as a class, the experimental evidence at 
this time definitely points to the existence of a Gettier effect on knowledge 
attributions.  However, even given the moderate level of noise that seems to 
afflict our epistemic verdicts in general, this effect seems (again, as of this time) 
to be both more intermittent, and more sensitive to epistemically-extraneous 
factors, than knowledge verdicts are on the whole.  Moreover, the rarity and 
weirdness of Gettier cases as targets of epistemic evaluation further suggest, at a 
minimum, that our selection of curves need not owe any special fealty to those 
cases. 
 
4. In all, as a matter of the epistemological theory of knowledge itself, and not 
just the psychological theory of the workings of folk epistemology, we should 
treat it as a live possibility that something more like JTB may be our best theory, 
despite the widespread existence of the Gettier effect.  And we will likely not be 
able to settle this question until further methodological improvements are made, 
that will enable us to evaluate proposed fit/simplicity trade-offs responsibly. 
 
So, to be emphatically clear on this last point, I do not think this really adds up to 
a positive case that we should, in fact, all things considered, at this time, endorse 
JTB over JTBG.  We need to look out for what kind of trade-off to make between 
simplicity and closeness-of-fit, and given the general noisiness regarding verdicts 
about epistemic cases, and Gettier cases in particular, we should certainly not 
assume that we are in a position to sacrifice the simplicity of JTB for the 
apparently greater fit of some JTBG.  But in our current state of methodological 
impoverishment, we absolutely cannot assume, either, that we should not make 
the trade in that direction. We should, rather, take ourselves to be  currently in a 
state of unresolved ignorance regarding the epistemic significance of the Gettier 
cases as they manifest in our case verdicts. I will close by suggesting three distinct 
and complementary ways we should look to resolve that ignorance, moving 
forward. 
 
First: we need more data!  There has been a terrific explosion of Gettier-related 
results, and it is particularly encouraging that psychologists like Starmans and 
Friedman have recently wanted to get in on the game, and in a way that is deeply 
collaborative with philosophers.  But for all that it is still early days yet, especially 
in terms of exploring empirically the different dimensions along which different 
Gettier cases might vary.  The overall picture that develops may reveal an ever-
increasing set of quirks -- or it also may instead resolve into a much more modest 
and stable set of effects, and ones that can make a better claim to being 
incorporated into our theories of knowledge.  (Indeed it is always a danger in 
writing a chapter like this one, that by the time it sees print, the empirical tide 
may have turned against it.  It’s just a risk an author has to take, in this area; 
dulce periculum est.) 
 
The expertise defense should be promising to explore in this particular area.  
That is, perhaps the Gettier-related flukes and fluctuations in the experimental 
data can be explained away in terms of deficits manifested by the folk when they 
produce their verdicts, while philosophers, due to training or acumen, may prove 
immune to such foibles. Now, on the whole the 'expertise defense' has fared 
rather poorly (Schulz et al. (2011); Machery (2012); Nado (2014); Tobia et al. 
(2013); Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2015); Buckwalter (forthcoming).  So one 
should make no presumption that the expert populations' verdict data will prove 
to be completely noiseless, when compared to the folk. Nonetheless, even if it 
seems highly unlikely that all of the intermittence and inappropriate sensitivity 
will be explained away in terms of the folk’s lack of expertise, it is also still very 
plausible that at least some of it will prove to be amenable to such a treatment. 
And indeed, at least some results are highly suggestive in that regard.  As noted 
above, Turri (2013) reports articulating Gettier cases to make their distinct 
aspects clearer and more salient can sharply decrease subjects' attributions of 
knowledge.  And Pinillos et al. (2011) have shown that more reflective subjects 
may be less sensitive to the Knobe effect in general, and thus we could conjecture 
that they may be less susceptible to the Knobe-meets-Gettier phenomena as well.  
And of course, at least anecdotally, analytic philosophers tend to display a 
uniformly and robustly strong Gettier effect, taking such cases to be paradigm 
instances of non-knowledge. But on the whole, we really just do not know where 
philosophical expertise does or does not defuse these worries about noise in the 
verdict data. It will be a highly valuable empirical project to determine just where 
philosophical expertise can make such a difference, or where it fails to do so. 
 
Second, and no less urgently if we are going to address the issue of the 
simplicity/fit tradeoff, we need to figure out how to adapt better quantitative 
methods of inference for philosophical inference.  In particular, we need to put 
ourselves into a position to be able to apply quantitative modeling approaches 
more rigorously.  There are excellent formal tools that empirical modelers use 
when trying to decide when it is or is not a good idea to complicate a model, such 
the Bayes Information Criterion or the Akaike Information Criterion, that 
provide a mathematical measure of the trade-off between adding additional 
parameters to one's model, and how close a fit the model is to the observations.  
We are not yet anywhere near where we can think about the space of knowledge 
verdicts on the whole in such terms.  One way to see this methodological deficit is 
to ask yourself, just how far apart are JTB from JTBG, in terms of their fit to the 
data?  How big a divergence from the verdict data is JTB to begin with? After all, 
they agree on a considerably huge subset of verdicts. And of course we will want 
ultimately to be able to evaluate both the degree of fit and the degree of 
complexity for a range other sorts of rival hypotheses; e.g., how does SAFELY 
HELD TRUE BELIEF do in these terms, compared to those rivals?  Or other 
candidate proposals for how to fill in the G in JTBG? For that matter, we will 
want to make sure that even JTB would win in a heads-up competition against 
the likes of such obviously even simpler theories like K=TB. (Or if it doesn’t, then 
that would be a pretty interesting result, too!) Because we really have at present 
no way of answering questions like those that is even slightly non-handwaving, 
we have no way of rigorously evaluating different possible simplicity/fit trade-
offs.  Until we can get further along in that direction, we may have to treat the 
selection between JTB and its many rivals as an open choice, with a much wider 
space of live epistemic possibilities than we had reckoned. 
 
That brings me to my third methodological suggestion for how we should 
proceed.  Once we recognize that our space of theoretical possibilities is still 
rather more open than we may have thought, we need to explore these newly-
reopened regions of epistemology space more fully. Some philosophers will, quite 
reasonably, want to contend that we should appeal to general theoretical results 
in epistemology to winnow down the hypothesis space, such that perhaps 
findings about, say, epistemic luck could pre-empt further consideration of JTB.  
I want to be clear that of course, wherever we have theoretical results that are 
arrived at in a largely verdict-independent way, they should of course be brought 
to bear as a separate constraint on our investigations.  As I noted in the 
introduction, I am taking it as a given that abductive inferences from verdict data 
is an important method in epistemology, but not at all the method of 
epistemology.5  So I am not objecting to this general idea at all, that we should 
bring such considerations in. For example, we may take ourselves to have good 
reasons to treat knowledge as factive, above and beyond what the verdict data 
may look like, and this may play a role in fact in sorting our some apparent 
oddities in the verdict data in terms of protagonist projection and the like.  
 
For all that, though, we need to be very careful about a kind of path-dependency 
here: we epistemologists have arrived at a state of consensus or near-consensus 
regarding many of these claims in no small part because of what Blouw et al. call 
the "business as usual" status of the Gettier verdict.  It need not be the case that 
those claims depend entirely on those verdicts; they don't.  But we have spent a 
half century now vigorously and creatively exploring the virtues of theories that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  And,	  for	  example,	  I	  think	  that	  a	  version	  of	  Edward	  Craig's	  teleological	  methodology	  in	  his	  (1990)	  would	  be	  well	  worth	  bringing	  into	  greater	  contact	  with	  the	  method	  of	  cases.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  my	  (2015b).	  
respect that verdict data, and thus many of those virtues are fairly plain to view at 
this point. Yet we have just not done much to explore notions of knowledge that 
would be robust to things like epistemic luck, truthmaker-disconnection, and the 
like.  Such recondite theories of knowledge will likely have verdict-independent 
theoretical virtues of their own -- epistemologically attractive features beyond 
how efficiently they may capture much of the verdict data.  I would speculate, for 
example, that they may offer a satisfactory picture of how we can easily transition 
from knowing "P is highly likely" to knowing, simply, "P", as we seem to do often 
in our everyday cognition but which can be tricky to theorize in our theory of 
knowledge. 
 
The noisiness in the vicinity of the Gettier cases also suggest another dimension 
in which we should explore epistemological theory-space.  My discussion here 
has focused on the question of whether the verdict data in this neighborhood are 
really what epistemologists since Gettier himself have taken them to be, or 
whether they are misleading.  Are they a signal of an epistemological truth that 
knowledge is more demanding than JTB -- an authentic signal, even if perhaps a 
weaker one than epistemologists have thought?  Or instead, are are they instead a 
bit of noise, something our epistemological theories should bypass, not 
incorporate?  But those two options are not exhaustive. There is at least one other 
possible way to understand the status of the Gettier cases: while they do signal 
what really is an authentic epistemological insight, those facts are not ones 
ultimately best realized within our theory of knowledge.  Something about these 
cases is pretty reliably registering with subjects, across a wide range of studies, as 
epistemically amiss, but those subjects at the same time neither universally nor at 
full strength, seem willing totally to reject them as knowledge.  Believing truly in 
a luck-proof manner, or with sensitivity, or with safety, or while depending on no 
false lemmas... these are all epistemic desiderata in their own right, and should 
find a home in our epistemological theorizing whether or not they can or should 
play a role in theorizing knowledge itself.  One further methodological upshot of 
taking the noise in our verdict data seriously, is that Alston's desideratum-based 
approach (2005) should itself be explored more thoroughly, and in particular, 
should be evaluated for extending its application from his own original target of 
justification, to knowledge itself. 
 
There should be little doubt that a half century ago Gettier brought to light a truly 
fascinating piece of human psychology, and we now have the evidence to entitle 
us to take it to be a fairly widespread phenomenon, perhaps even a universal one. 
But determining how best to incorporate Gettier’s psychological insight into our 
theory of knowledge remains a more open question than epistemologists hitherto 
have generally taken it to be, and one that likely cannot be answered well until we 
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